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Abstract 
Objective. One of the most common tools for studying prosociality is the dictator game, in 
which allocations to one’s partner are often described in terms of altruism. However, there is less 
consensus regarding the motivations driving these allocations, which may represent either 
emotional concern for others (compassion), adherence to social norms regarding fairness 
(politeness), or both. 
Method. In this paper, we apply personality psychology to the study of behavior in the dictator 
game, in which we examine the discriminant validity of distinct prosocial constructs from the 
Big Five and HEXACO models in relation to allocations of wealth. 
Results. Across four studies (combined N = 798) utilizing both hypothetical and incentivized 
designs, we found that the politeness—but not compassion—aspect of Big Five agreeableness, as 
well as HEXACO honesty-humility, uniquely predicted dictator allocations within their 
respective personality models. 
Conclusions. These findings contribute to a growing literature indicating that the standard 
dictator game measures “good manners” or adherence to norms concerning fairness, rather than 
pure emotional concern or compassionate motives, which have important implications for how 
this paradigm is used and interpreted in psychological research. 
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Individual differences in good manners rather than compassion predict fair allocations of wealth 
in the dictator game 
Economic decision-making paradigms are useful tools for assessing basic psychological 
preferences that shape human behavior, such as time discounting, risk aversion, and prosociality 
(Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, & Kautz, 2011; Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse, 
2012; Ferguson, Heckman, & Corr, 2011). Prosociality and social preferences for outcomes that 
benefit others are often studied using the dictator game, in which one player decides on a 
distribution of money that a second player must accept unconditionally (Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). Although it is a simple unilateral 
task, experimental findings from the dictator game have attracted much interest due to their 
departure from traditional economic assumptions of pure self-interest. Hundreds of studies have 
shown that—amid substantial individual differences in the size of these allocations—most 
people will transfer a positive amount of money to their partners, with a mean of 28% of the 
initial endowment (Engel, 2011). These non-zero transfers have been interpreted broadly in 
terms of altruism and incorporated into several models of social preferences (Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), although this interpretation has not gone unchallenged 
(Camerer & Thaler, 1995). 
In this paper, we examine the aspect level of personality structure to better understand the 
motivations driving so-called altruistic behavior in the dictator game, by examining how distinct 
prosocial tendencies account for heterogeneity in allocations of wealth. A major theme to emerge 
from the vast literature on the dictator game, as well as models of social preferences, is the 
substantial heterogeneity in people’s allocations (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Daruvala, 2010; 
Engel, 2011). Across four studies, we demonstrate that personality constructs reflecting 
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politeness, rather than compassion, help explain this heterogeneity. These findings support the 
view that dictator behavior reflects motivations concerning rules of fairness (Bolton, Katok, & 
Zwick, 1998; Camerer & Thaler, 1995) and have important implications for how this “index of 
prosociality” should be interpreted in psychological research. 
What do Allocations of Wealth in the Dictator Game Represent? 
Allocations in the dictator game are typically described in terms of altruism and altruistic 
behavior (e.g., Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007; Ben-Ner & Kramer, 2011; Israel et al., 
2009), as well as generosity (e.g., Haley & Fessler, 2005; Piazza & Bering, 2008). However, 
these terms have been neither consistently nor precisely defined, and are also sometimes used 
across different disciplines to refer to separate processes. Within economics, one common 
behavioral definition of altruism refers to “costly acts that confer economic benefits on other 
individuals” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, p. 785), which may arise from a number of different 
motivational states. This can be distinguished from the psychological definition of altruism as “a 
motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare” (Batson, 1991, p. 6), 
which is thought to be primarily based on empathic concern around another’s wellbeing and 
involves feelings of compassion and tenderness (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 
1981; Batson, 2010). From this psychological perspective, the motivations that underlie altruistic 
allocations of wealth in the dictator game may be driven by emotional concern for others. For 
example, Edele, Dziobek, and Keller (2013) found that self-report measures of affective empathy, 
or the experience of feelings congruent with another’s emotional situation, predicted the amount 
of money offered to a partner in the dictator game, although this has not been the case in other 
studies (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Sääksvuori, 2014). 
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In contrast to the empathy–altruism interpretation, other researchers in behavioral 
economics have highlighted the importance of social norms, arguing that dictator decisions 
represent adherence to social rules concerning fairness, rather than emotional concern, kindness, 
or an intrinsic desire to enhance the welfare of others (Bolton et al., 1998; Camerer & Thaler, 
1995). Indeed, Camerer and Thaler (1995) discussed the role of “manners” as a manifestation of 
learned rules of fairness distinct from altruism and argued that etiquette dictated appropriate 
responses in experimental games and in interdependent behavior more generally. There is a large 
body of literature on the role of social norms in shaping cooperation, collective action, and 
prosocial behavior, as well as the development of social sanction systems to enforce these norms 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Ostrom, 2000). 
The distinction between empathic concern versus adherence to social norms as drivers of 
prosocial behaviors has a long history in the economics literature. In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759/2002), Adam Smith described altruistic impulses arising from benevolent 
affections of pity and compassion in contrast to the stronger forces of one’s sense of duty and 
conscience, which are governed by self and social censure (see also Batson, 1991, for a 
discussion). Similarly, Andreoni (1989, 1990) and Dawes and Thaler (1988) distinguish between 
pure altruism, in which individuals are driven by the motivation to increase the welfare of others 
without any personal benefit, and impure altruism, which involves “doing the right thing”, “a 
satisfaction of conscience, or of noninstrumental ethical mandates” (Dawes & Thaler, 1988, p. 
192). 
Personality Traits Underlying Behavioral Heterogeneity in the Dictator Game 
The motivations for altruistic behavior in the dictator game may also be reflected in the 
personality traits underlying behavioral heterogeneity in allocations of wealth. In a recent review, 
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Zhao and Smillie (2015) reported that variation in dictator allocations could be understood in 
terms of prosocial traits represented within major models of personality structure. Within the 
widely-accepted “Big Five” (B5) model, agreeableness is the tendency to be kind-hearted, 
altruistic, considerate, and cooperative, and is based on the motivation of maintaining positive 
interpersonal relations (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). Several studies have now shown that B5 
agreeableness is a consistent positive predictor of dictator offers, as well as prosocial game 
behaviors more generally (e.g., Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt, 2014; Becker et al., 2012; Ben-
Ner, Kong, & Putterman, 2004; Ferguson, Gancarczyk, Wood, Delaney, & Corr, 2015; Foschi & 
Lauriola, 2014; for a review, see Zhao & Smillie, 2015). 
As the agreeableness domain is a very broad description of multiple prosocial tendencies, 
these existing findings cannot distinguish empathic concern from basic “good manners” or 
politeness. However, recent developments in personality research have demonstrated that B5 
agreeableness can be divided into two lower-level “aspects” of this trait domain: compassion, 
which reflects empathy and emotional concern for others, and politeness, which reflects the 
tendency to conform to social norms regarding acts that hurt or exploit others (DeYoung, Quilty, 
& Peterson, 2007). While the two are closely related, recent research has highlighted their 
divergence with respect to political ideology and the moral foundations (Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & 
Peterson, 2010; Osborne, Wootton, & Sibley, 2013). They are also thought to be underpinned by 
distinct biological substrates, with compassion hypothesized to reflect neuroendocrinological 
processes involved in affiliation, such as oxytocin function (DeYoung, Weisberg, Quilty, & 
Peterson, 2013; Feldman, Weller, Zagoory-Sharon, & Levine, 2007). In comparison, politeness 
is associated with tendencies toward (lower) dominance and aggression, which may be 
underpinned by testosterone function (DeYoung et al., 2013; Zuckerman, 2005). To date, no 
GOOD MANNERS AND COMPASSION IN THE DICTATOR GAME   7 
studies have contrasted the roles of these two aspects of B5 agreeableness in relation to 
allocations within the dictator game. This would help tease apart whether individual differences 
in these allocations are driven by empathic concern, adherence to norms promoting the wellbeing 
of others, or both. 
A major alternative model of personality to the Big Five is the HEXACO (Honesty-
Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to 
Experience), a six-factor model based on psycholexical studies of European and Asian languages 
(Lee & Ashton, 2004). In this model, there are two prosocial traits forming complementary 
aspects of reciprocal altruism (Ashton & Lee, 2001, 2007). HEXACO agreeableness is the 
tendency to be forgiving and tolerant of the misgivings of others, which is considered a “reactive” 
form of cooperation. This is theoretically distinct from HEXACO honesty-humility, the tendency 
to be fair despite opportunities for exploitation, which is considered an “active” form of 
cooperation (Hilbig, Zettler, Leist, & Heydasch, 2013). In line with this conceptualization, 
several studies have consistently found that HEXACO honesty-humility, rather than HEXACO 
agreeableness, is strongly associated with dictator game allocations—and perhaps more so than 
B5 agreeableness (Hilbig, Thielmann, Hepp, Klein, & Zettler, 2015; Hilbig et al., 2013; Hilbig & 
Zettler, 2009; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014; see Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Interestingly, honesty-
humility overlaps conceptually with the politeness aspect of B5 agreeableness, as both contain 
items reflecting respect for others’ rights and suppression of aggressive behavior, which may be 
characterized more generally by adherence to norms concerning appropriate social conduct 
(DeYoung et al., 2007). In support of this suggestion, it was recently shown that honesty-
humility is closely aligned with politeness within a circumplex model of interpersonal traits 
(Barford, Zhao, & Smillie, 2015). 
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Aims and Outline of this Paper 
Personality psychology can aid our understanding of the psychological processes within 
economic games by explaining some of the behavioral heterogeneity and by improving the 
predictive and explanatory validity of these games. Our aim in this paper was to provide a finely-
grained analysis of the role that prosocial personality traits play in dictator game allocations, 
based on two alternative models of personality, the Big Five and the HEXACO. We were 
particularly interested in the discriminant validity between theoretically distinct prosocial 
constructs—the aspects of B5 agreeableness as well as the HEXACO traits comprising reciprocal 
altruism—in predicting game behaviors. These findings would shed new light on the 
mechanisms and motivations (e.g., empathic concern versus norm adherence or politeness) 
underlying prosocial allocations of wealth and clarify how the standard dictator game should be 
interpreted. Examining these major alternative models of personality would also clarify how the 
Big Five and HEXACO models are related, particularly given recent discussion around the 
theoretical similarity between HEXACO honesty-humility and aspects or facets of B5 
agreeableness (see Ashton, Lee, & de Vries, 2014; DeYoung et al., 2007; McCrae & Costa, 2008; 
van Kampen, 2012). In line with the literature reviewed above, we hypothesized that politeness, 
rather than the compassion aspect of B5 agreeableness in the Big Five model, would be 
associated with prosocial allocations of wealth in the dictator game. Given its conceptual 
similarity to politeness, we expected that these findings to be closely replicated for honesty-
humility, rather than agreeableness, in the HEXACO model. 
We also sought to address the limitations of the previous literature that were highlighted 
in a recent review on personality and economic games (Zhao & Smillie, 2015). This was 
achieved in four ways: by improving sampling (i.e., including larger and more diverse samples), 
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measurement (i.e., investigating game behaviors across multiple personality models), design (i.e., 
using both hypothetical and incentivized paradigms, providing comprehension questions and 
attention checks, and controlling for social desirability), and analysis (i.e., examining unique trait 
effects and divergent validity through regressions controlling for non-focal personality 
dimensions). This emphasis on methodological rigor and consistency, as well as the evaluation 
of the replicability of our findings across multiple studies, is expected to yield clearer 
conclusions about the role of personality in economic games. 
The following sections detail four studies contrasting prosocial personality traits of 
politeness and compassion with respect to allocations of wealth in the dictator game. These 
findings are examined across varying levels of incentivization and demographically-different 
samples. Studies 1 and 2 consisted of hypothetical dictator games conducted in an Australian 
university student sample and a North American community sample recruited through the online 
marketplace Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com). In Study 3, we attempted to 
replicate these findings in a larger MTurk sample, in which we administered an alternative 
version of the dictator game embedded within a number of wealth allocation tasks. Given that 
Studies 1–3 were based on hypothetical designs, one concern is that they were limited by socially 
desirable responding. Indeed, some behavioral economists have challenged the external validity 
of decision-making studies with no salient material rewards, arguing that participants may not be 
adequately motivated to behave as they would in the field (Ariely & Norton, 2007; Hertwig & 
Ortmann, 2001). We addressed this in Study 4 by using an incentivized and double-blind 
paradigm, in which participants played with real partners and were paid according to their 
decisions.  
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Method 
Participants 
 Study 1. The final sample consisted of 192 first-year psychology students at an 
Australian university (aged 18–46 years, Mage = 20.21, SD = 4.52; 75% female), who completed 
the study for course credit. While 42% percent of participants identified as being Australian, 37% 
identified as being of East, South, or South-Eastern Asian ethnicity, and the remaining 21% were 
a combination of European, North American, Middle-Eastern, and mixed ethnicities. Further 
details on the proportion of excluded participants and the reasons for these exclusions are 
provided in Table 1 and in the Procedure section. 
Study 2. The final sample consisted of 212 North American MTurk workers (aged 18–57 
years, Mage = 29.94, SD = 8.47; 59% female). The majority of participants identified as being 
White or Caucasian (79%), with 7.1% identifying as African American, 6.1% as Hispanic, and 
4.2% as Asian. Only workers with an approval rating higher than 98% and with fewer than 50 
Human Intelligence Tasks completed were recruited. The latter was selected to avoid recruiting 
workers experienced with well-known economic game paradigms (see Chandler, Mueller, & 
Paolacci, 2014), which was later confirmed by asking participants if they were familiar with the 
tasks. All participants were paid US$2. 
Study 3. The final sample consisted of 304 North American MTurk workers (aged 18–65 
years, Mage = 30.90, SD = 9.89; 55% female). The majority of participants identified as being 
White or Caucasian (76%), with 8.9% identifying as Hispanic, 6.3% as African American, and 
4.9% as Asian. Workers were selected based on the same criteria and paid the same amount as 
those in Study 2. 
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Study 4. The final sample consisted of 90 participants (aged 18–33 years, Mage = 22.38, 
SD = 3.76; 70% female) recruited through advertisements posted around an Australian university. 
Participants were predominantly students from a mixture of disciplines, as well as those 
employed full-time or currently unemployed. Approximately half (53%) of participants 
identified as being of East, South, or South-Eastern Asian ethnicity, while 17% identified as 
being of Australian ethnicity, and the remainder were a combination of European, North 
American, Middle-Eastern, and mixed ethnicities. All participants were paid a show-up fee of 
AU$15 for attending the study, in addition to bonus payments earned from study tasks. 
Personality Measures 
Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007). Participants in all four studies 
completed the BFAS, which measures the five broad domains of personality (neuroticism, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness/intellect), and is the only measure 
to divide each domain into two correlated aspects (which lie between facets and domains in the 
trait hierarchy). We were specifically interested in the prosocial domain of agreeableness and its 
compassion (empathic affiliation with others, e.g., “feel other’s emotions”) and politeness 
(consideration and respect for others, e.g., “avoid imposing my will on others”) aspects. 
However, we included items for all five broad domains and their aspects to examine their 
divergent validity. Each aspect consists of 10 items to which participants respond using 5-point 
Likert scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The BFAS has been well validated 
against other measures of the Big Five, including the Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue, & 
Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008) and the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO 
PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992), and demonstrates good internal consistency and test–retest 
reliability (DeYoung et al., 2007). 
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HEXACO (Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience) Personality Inventory—Revised 
(HEXACO-PI-R; Lee & Ashton, 2004). Participants in all four studies completed the 100-item 
HEXACO-PI-R, a major alternative model of personality to the Big Five. Within the HEXACO 
model, agreeableness and emotionality are considered rotational variants of their Big Five 
counterparts, and a sixth dimension, honesty-humility, is believed to capture additional variance 
relating to fair and modest tendencies (Ashton et al., 2014; Lee & Ashton, 2004). The apparent 
similarity between honesty-humility and the politeness aspect of B5 agreeableness was of 
particular interest given the aims of the present research. Each trait consists of 16 items to which 
participants respond using 5-point Likert scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
All HEXACO analyses were performed at the level of broad trait domains, which have good 
internal consistencies (Lee & Ashton, 2004). 
Procedure 
 Table 1 presents summary information and major results from each study. Participants in 
all four studies completed demographic questions, personality measures, and the dictator game 
on a survey programmed using Qualtrics Survey Software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Studies 1–3 
were conducted online with the latter two administered through the MTurk requester interface. In 
Study 4, participants attended a laboratory at an Australian university in small groups of 
approximately 4 to 6 people (average group size of 4.86 people) and were seated in front of 
personal computers on which they completed all tasks. 
In all four studies, participants completed additional questionnaires and economic games 
that were not relevant to the aims of the current research. In Studies 1, 2, and 4, all personality 
questionnaires were presented in a randomized order, and participants were randomly assigned to 
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one of four different orders of the economic games based on a Latin squares design. In Study 3, 
the dictator game was embedded within six different decomposed economic allocation tasks 
requiring participants to select between different combinations of payoffs with their partner. 
Participants in Study 3 also completed a well-validated measure of social desirability, the Social 
Desirability Scale–17 (Stöber, 2001), in which they rated sixteen statements as true or false. 
Dictator game. In Studies 1 and 2, participants completed a hypothetical version of the 
standard dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994; Kahneman et al., 1986), in which they read about 
the roles of the two players and were then asked to imagine how they would divide 10 points 
(corresponding with dollar amounts) if they had been assigned to the role of the dictator. In 
Study 3, participants completed a simpler version of the hypothetical dictator game in which they 
selected between different combinations of payoffs for themselves and their partner, all of which 
summed to $10. In all three studies, the hypothetical recipient was described as a complete 
stranger that participants would not knowingly meet. 
In Study 4, participants completed the same economic games as those from earlier 
studies, but were informed that their earnings from one of these games would be selected for 
bonus payment at the end of the session. In the dictator game, all participants were asked to 
divide $10 between themselves and an anonymous, randomly-selected partner from the same 
session. When there was an odd number of participants in one session, they were told that two 
players would be randomly selected and together paired with one player. The allocation of the 
single player would be simultaneously applied to both players (when they were the recipients) or 
the single player would receive one of the allocations randomly selected out of the two players 
(when they were the dictators). Participants were also informed that a “double-blind” design was 
in place so that they could be not be identified with their decision by other participants or by the 
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experimenter. This was done by having participants create a code from meaningless fragments of 
personal information at the start of the session, which was later sent electronically to the 
experimenter along with their decisions. Bonus payments were then provided in envelopes 
labelled with the code, which participants retrieved at the end of the session. 
In all four studies, the terms “game” and “player”, which may have connotations of 
competition, were omitted in favor of more neutral terms (i.e., “task”, “person”). To check their 
understanding of the dictator game, participants completed several comprehension questions 
(four in Studies 1 and 2, two in Study 4) requiring them to calculate the amount that each player 
would receive in a variety of different scenarios. Studies 3 and 4 also contained two attention 
checks embedded in personality measures to ensure that participants were reading instructions 
correctly. Based on these, a number of participants (between 5.4% in Study 2 and 13% in Study 
4) were excluded based on incorrect answers to game comprehension questions or failed 
attention checks. 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
Results 
Preliminary Statistics 
 Prosocial personality variables. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between 
variables are presented in Table 2. We first examined relationships between personality traits 
within the Big Five model, where the compassion aspect of agreeableness and the enthusiasm 
aspect of extraversion were positively related, and the politeness aspect of agreeableness and the 
assertiveness aspect of extraversion were negatively related. These observations are in line with 
previous research mapping the relations among the interpersonal aspects of the Big Five 
(DeYoung et al., 2013). We next compared relationships between prosocial traits across the Big 
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Five and HEXACO models. In Studies 1 and 2, B5 agreeableness was equally correlated with 
HEXACO honesty-humility and agreeableness, while the relationship with the latter was 
relatively weaker in Studies 3 and 4. In all four studies, honesty-humility was more strongly 
related to the politeness rather than compassion aspect of B5 agreeableness.  
Dictator allocations. Mean allocations to a partner in the dictator game are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. Allocations ranged between 26% (Study 4) to 46% (Study 3) of the total amount, 
with 5.9% (Study 3) to 34% (Study 4) of participants keeping all of the money for themselves. 
Incentivized allocations in Study 4 were significantly lower than hypothetical allocations in 
Studies 1–3 combined, t(796) = 9.42, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.06. 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
The Relation between Prosocial Traits and Dictator Allocations 
Broad personality domains. We first examined bivariate correlations between broad 
personality variables and dictator allocations. Across all four studies, the only Big Five domain 
correlated with dictator allocations was agreeableness. In the HEXACO model, honesty-humility 
was the only trait consistently associated with allocations, while agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and openness to experience were also related to allocations in Studies 1, 3, 
and 4, respectively. 
A series of multiple regression models was then run on dictator allocations against broad 
traits from the Big Five and HEXACO models. Standardized regression coefficients from these 
models are presented in Table 3. These were largely consistent with correlational data, with B5 
agreeableness and HEXACO honesty-humility emerging as the only consistent predictors in their 
respective models, while HEXACO openness to experience was an additional unique predictor in 
Study 4. 
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< Insert Table 3 here > 
Aspects of B5 agreeableness. To probe the results further, we examined the role of the 
two aspects of agreeableness, politeness and compassion, in dictator allocations. In Studies 1–3, 
correlational data indicated that politeness and compassion were both significantly associated 
with dictator allocations, while incentivized dictator allocations in Study 4 showed no zero-order 
correlations with compassion at all. Because politeness and compassion were intercorrelated, we 
entered both aspects simultaneously into a regression model for each study, presented in Table 4. 
This revealed that politeness, but not compassion, was the only significant unique predictor of 
dictator allocations in each of the four studies. 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
Discussion 
Across four studies, we aimed to identify the specific prosocial traits accounting for 
variation in allocations of wealth in the standard dictator game, and in doing so, shed light on the 
motivations underlying such prosocial behaviors. Consistent with previous literature (Baumert et 
al., 2014; Becker et al., 2012; Ben-Ner et al., 2004; Foschi & Lauriola, 2014; Hilbig, Thielmann, 
Hepp, et al., 2015; Hilbig et al., 2013; Hilbig & Zettler, 2009; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014) and 
our predictions, broad personality traits concerned with promoting interpersonal harmony and 
cooperation—B5 agreeableness and HEXACO honesty-humility—were associated with 
prosocial allocations in all four studies. Our findings are also in keeping with other studies of 
economic games, where B5 agreeableness was related to greater cooperation in the prisoner’s 
dilemma (Kagel & McGee, 2014), contributions in the public goods game (Volk, Thöni, & 
Ruigrok, 2011), responsible harvesting in a resource dilemma (Koole, Jager, van den Berg, Vlek, 
& Hofstee, 2001), and amounts transferred and returned to a partner in the trust game (Becker et 
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al., 2012; Evans & Revelle, 2008). We observed similar effect sizes to those reported in previous 
findings, which were close to the average correlation in the whole of personality and social 
psychology (r = .21; Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003; Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Such results 
have often been interpreted in terms of individual differences for kind-heartedness, warmth, and 
compassion, but until now have not been contrasted with other motivations that promote positive 
interpersonal relations. 
To address this gap in the literature, we further scrutinized the findings for B5 
agreeableness by comparing its aspects of politeness and compassion. This revealed the novel 
finding that prosocial behavior in the dictator game was driven by traits reflecting good manners 
and adherence to social norms (i.e., the politeness aspect of B5 agreeableness), rather than 
compassion. That is, once we controlled for the tendency to uphold norms around fairness and 
respect for others, we did not see a unique role for individual differences in emotional concern 
for others. We observed a similar pattern of findings for honesty-humility from the HEXACO 
model, indicating that the results for politeness could be generalized to conceptually-similar 
traits. 
Our findings revealed consistent patterns of results and effect sizes across four different 
and relatively large samples using both hypothetical and incentivized paradigms. Furthermore, 
the divergence between politeness and compassion was most prominent in a financially-
incentivized double-blind dictator game, although the difference in significance between these 
two aspects may not necessarily be significant itself (Gelman & Stern, 2006). We also observed 
somewhat weaker findings for politeness, as well as HEXACO honesty-humility, in Study 3. 
This is possibly attributable to the greatly simplified nature of the dictator game in this study, 
which lacked the detailed descriptions of the task and player roles featured in our other studies. 
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Overall, our results are founded on a number of methodological merits—including 
systematic examination of trait effects across major models of personality, as well as analyses of 
unique trait effects—which have allowed us to draw clearer conclusions against the background 
of the fledgling literature on personality and economic games. In addition, very few studies in 
this area have examined the unique effects of B5 agreeableness while controlling for 
theoretically-similar prosocial constructs, while no studies of the dictator game have examined 
agreeableness at the level of lower-order aspects. These findings will be discussed in detail in the 
following sections.  
Politeness and the Role of Social Norms in the Dictator Game 
The most novel finding from the current study is that dictator allocations were predicted 
primarily by individual differences in politeness, which contrasts with traditional interpretations 
highlighting altruism and associated prosocial tendencies of kind-heartedness, warmth, and 
affiliation. Our results contribute to a growing body of literature indicating that dictator game 
distributions arise from personal and social rules around fairness, and not necessarily around an 
intrinsic emotional concern for the welfare of others (Bolton et al., 1998; Camerer & Thaler, 
1995; Guala & Mittone, 2010; Leiberg, Klimecki, & Singer, 2011). Specifically, they revealed 
that polite individuals behaved in accordance with fair distributions of wealth in the dictator 
game, while individuals with greater empathic concern were no more likely than others to 
allocate greater wealth to a partner after controlling for their good manners. The absence of a 
role for empathic concern fits with recent findings in which the capacity for empathy did not 
predict social preferences in neutrally-framed dictator games (Artinger et al., 2014). 
Likewise, our results mirror the divergence of two correlates of real-world helping 
behaviors: dispositional empathic concern, the tendency to experience compassionate reactions 
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to the needs of others, and the principle of care, the tendency to endorse a moral position of 
helping others (Wilhelm & Bekkers, 2010). Specifically, researchers examined these individual 
differences in relation to 10 types of helping behaviors reported in a nationally-representative 
survey, where they found that the association between helping and the principle of care was far 
more consistent and direct than that for dispositional empathic concern. 
These findings complement research suggesting that there are two main motivations in 
social decision making, one that is fairness-based and one that is compassion-based (Singer & 
Steinbeis, 2009), which correspond closely with individual differences in politeness and 
compassion. While both motivations can contribute to cooperation, they are driven by different 
neural mechanisms and predict different behavioral responses when social norms are violated 
(Singer & Steinbeis, 2009). Adding to this, a recent study showed that compassion training led to 
increased helping in a task reflecting compassion-based prosocial behavior (the Zurich prosocial 
game) but not in the dictator game, which was believed to represent norm-based prosocial 
behavior (Leiberg et al., 2011). Together with these findings, the present research suggests that 
assuming the dictator game to be a pure measure of altruism, kindness, or compassion, in which 
players are emotionally invested in the wellbeing of their recipients may be misguided. This 
problem is likely to be further compounded by the inconsistent, imprecise, and interchangeable 
use of terms such as “prosocial”, “altruistic”, “unselfish”, and “other-regarding” in the literature, 
conflating subtly distinct motives for behaviors that promote the welfare of others. 
It is important to add that none of these considerations imply that there is no role for 
compassion and empathic concern in prosocial behavior in general. It may be that the standard, 
neutrally-framed dictator game is a de-contextualized situation in which the absence of any cues 
indicating a partner’s distress, suffering, or need leads individuals to default to social norms 
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concerning fairness. Those who adhere most strongly to such norms thus make the most 
equitable allocations of wealth, and conversely, those who have the most disregard for such 
norms will behave most selfishly. Indeed, Eckel and Grossman (1996) have argued that the 
double-blind nature of dictator tasks directly inhibits altruistic tendencies as it prevents any 
information about recipients from impacting on social decisions, leaving little to motivate 
compassionate behavior. Future research could examine under what conditions factors such as 
compassion and emotional concern for others’ wellbeing may override social norms to determine 
prosocial behaviors in economic games. For example, manipulations of empathy—by asking 
participants to take the perspective of a partner who recently experienced adversity—have led to 
greater cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, even after knowledge that a partner has defected 
(in which case, the norm would arguably be mutual defection; Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & 
Moran, 1999). In other circumstances, manipulations of empathy can also impede collective 
interest, such as in the public goods game, where it can divert allocation of resources away from 
the collective good and towards an individual who is the target of empathy (Batson et al., 1995; 
see also Ferguson, 2015, for a recent review). 
The current findings also attest to the value of examining personality–behavior 
relationships below the level of broad domains, where divergent patterns of behavior may be 
observed between more finely-grained personality constructs.1 Our findings are in tune with 
recent work showing that the dual aspects of agreeableness diverged in their associations with 
political ideology. While politeness, largely driven by traditionalism and normative cooperative 
behavior, was linked with political conservatism, compassion was closely tied to liberalism 
(Hirsh et al., 2010; Osborne et al., 2013). Furthermore, politeness was most associated with the 
moral foundation of authority/respect and positively linked to right-wing authoritarianism, while 
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compassion was positively associated with the moral foundations of harm/care and 
fairness/reciprocity (Hirsh et al., 2010; Osborne et al., 2013).2 Our findings support these 
distinctions by providing novel evidence for the discriminant validity between politeness and 
compassion in a behavioral paradigm. 
Predictors of Dictator Allocations within the HEXACO Model of Personality 
In comparing two different personality models, our results highlighted the theoretical and 
empirical convergence between the politeness aspect of B5 agreeableness and HEXACO 
honesty-humility.3 The patterns of findings were near-identical for the two traits across our four 
studies, in line with similarities previously noted between these two trait constructs (DeYoung et 
al., 2007; cf. Ashton et al., 2014), as well as the observation that politeness and honesty-humility 
occupy the same space on the Interpersonal Circumplex (Barford et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, some findings hint at divergences between the two traits in relation to 
political orientation and norm adherence. For example, honesty-humility has been related to 
voting for left-wing political parties (Chirumbolo & Leone, 2010), while politeness has been 
associated with conservative ideology (Hirsh et al., 2010). Furthermore, individuals high on 
honesty-humility were recently found to behave consistently in favor of their partner in a 
redistribution paradigm, even when this violated fairness norms (Hilbig, Thielmann, Wührl, & 
Zettler, 2015). Further investigations may help characterize honesty-humility in relation to 
politeness by clarifying whether it captures adherence to social norms, internalized values about 
how one ought to behave, deference towards others, or other forms of benevolence. 
Importantly, however, while the HEXACO model captures substantial variance in 
dictator game behavior, it does not divide the prosocial domain in a way that allows us to 
examine whether such allocations are driven by politeness or compassion, unlike the BFAS. The 
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association between HEXACO honesty-humility and B5 politeness was just as strong as that 
between HEXACO agreeableness and politeness in Studies 1 (rs = .50) and 4 (rs = .48–.49). This 
suggests that the construct of reciprocal altruism in the HEXACO model—comprising both 
honesty-humility and agreeableness—may be characterized more generally by adherence to 
norms concerning cooperation, which has different evolutionary antecedents to other prosocial 
tendencies. In contrast, compassion was also consistently and moderately associated with other 
HEXACO domains of openness to experience and emotionality, of which the latter may share its 
origins in kin altruism and parental nurturance (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Batson, 2011). 
Interestingly, despite its association with politeness, HEXACO agreeableness played 
virtually no unique role in the dictator game. This could be explained by the rotated structure of 
the HEXACO interpersonal traits and its resultant strong association with the volatility aspect of 
B5 neuroticism (r = -.59 in Study 2 to r = -.73 in Study 4). Both traits share common variance 
capturing tendencies relating to irritability, spite, and difficulty controlling emotional impulses, 
which are somewhat less relevant given the unilateral allocation exercise of the dictator game. 
Consistent with previous research, the finding that honesty-humility—but not agreeableness—
uniquely predicted dictator allocations provides further support for the theoretical distinction 
between active and reactive cooperation within the HEXACO model (Hilbig et al., 2013; 
Thielmann, Hilbig, & Niedtfeld, 2014; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014).4 
Effects of Incentivization on Dictator Allocations and Relations with Personality 
Our studies provide a useful comparison of hypothetical versus incentivized paradigms, 
which have divided psychologists and economists over how such games should be conducted 
(Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). Several recent studies of economic paradigms—some of which 
have investigated the role of personality traits—have shown that hypothetical scenarios produce 
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similar patterns of results as incentivized games (Engel, 2011; Ferguson & Starmer, 2013; Hilbig, 
Thielmann, Hepp, et al., 2015). Other studies have reported varying effects of reward-related 
aspects of personality (i.e., extraversion) when results were compared between incentivized and 
hypothetical game paradigms (Ben-Ner, Kramer, & Levy, 2008; Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, & 
Walkowitz, 2011). 
We found that using hypothetical versions of the dictator game did not necessarily 
compromise the validity of dictator game findings when examining relations with personality, 
though they may yield smaller effect sizes. In Studies 1–3, hypothetical allocations were on par 
with results from hypothetical versions of the dictator game (around 40%; e.g., Amir, Rand, & 
Gal, 2012; Hilbig et al., 2013; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014). Consistent with previous studies 
indicating a shift in social preferences and a decrease in dictator transfers when individuals 
played with real stakes compared with hypothetical ones (Amir et al., 2012; Bühren & Kundt, 
2015), incentivized allocations fell to 26% in Study 4. Despite this substantial drop, correlations 
with the prosocial personality constructs of politeness and honesty-humility were strongest in the 
incentivized condition, while the effect of compassion disappeared altogether. 
Furthermore, the positive relationship between these prosocial traits and hypothetical 
allocations of money does not appear to be accounted for by socially desirable responding. 
Specifically, the number of endorsed items on the Social Desirability Scale–17 (Stöber, 2001) 
was not correlated with dictator allocations (ρ = .06, p = .34) in Study 3. An additional factor that 
may have encouraged socially desirable responding in Study 4 was the small group size in which 
participants completed the games. However, this is unlikely to have impacted on the findings, 
given the double-blind design and the average allocation in this study, which was lower than 
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those for all three hypothetical studies and on par with average dictator allocations in the 
economics literature (around 28%; Engel, 2011). 
Interestingly, the incentivized game in Study 4 revealed an additional unique effect of 
traits reflecting tendencies toward cognitive exploration and novelty, captured by HEXACO 
openness to experience, as well as the openness aspect of B5 openness/intellect. While not an 
interpersonal trait per se, these constructs have sometimes been associated with prosocial game 
behaviors, including greater contributions in the public goods game (Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch, 
2012) and higher investment in the trust game (Becker et al., 2012). As these findings were not 
replicated in our earlier studies, they are treated with some caution here. However, future 
investigations may shed light on the mechanisms underlying openness and whether they 
represent an additional pathway to prosocial behavior beyond traits traditionally concerned with 
interpersonal harmony. 
Conclusions 
 The dictator game has been used in hundreds of studies in the social, psychological, and 
biological sciences as an index of prosociality. However, there is a lack of consensus regarding 
the specific motivations that these allocations of wealth represent. Across four studies using both 
hypothetical and incentivized games, we showed that prosocial allocations were driven by 
personality traits reflecting compliance with norms concerning fairness, cooperation, and social 
conduct—the politeness aspect of B5 agreeableness—rather than traits reflecting compassion and 
empathic concern. This pattern of findings was closely mirrored by honesty-humility from the 
HEXACO model, a conceptually-similar trait capturing fair and non-exploitative behavior. 
This is the first study within an emerging literature at the interface of personality and 
economic games to support the role of fairness norms as the main driver of prosocial behavior in 
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the standard dictator game. Future investigations could build on these results by testing the 
motivations underlying emotional concern and good manners, as well as examining the 
situational features activating compassion- and politeness-based prosocial processes using both 
laboratory paradigms and their real-world analogs. Together, such investigations would have 
major implications for how economic games are designed and interpreted in psychological 
research, underscoring the need to revise assumptions about standard dictator allocations as a 
direct index of altruism, kindness, and compassion.  
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Footnotes 
1 Previous studies have also examined the links between the facets of agreeableness and 
dictator allocations, finding positive effects for the trust, morality, and sympathy facets of the 
NEO PI-R from the International Personality Item Pool (Foschi & Lauriola, 2014). However, the 
facet structure of the Big Five and its divergent validity are somewhat arbitrary and are not as 
clearly understood as the empirically-derived and biologically-based mid-level aspects of the Big 
Five (Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991; DeYoung et al., 2007). 
2 Interestingly, compassion has been found to be linked to endorsement of moral systems 
concerning equality (Hirsh et al., 2010), which is at odds with our finding that politeness is 
uniquely associated with preferences for fairness within the dictator game. This highlights the 
complexities and pitfalls of interpreting dictator game allocations—which may reflect 
compliance with fairness norms—as a direct and inherent measure of egalitarianism. 
3 Given similar findings for the politeness aspect of B5 agreeableness and HEXACO 
honesty-humility, and debate regarding the degree to which honesty-humility is independent of 
B5 agreeableness (Ashton et al., 2014; DeYoung et al., 2007; McCrae & Costa, 2008; van 
Kampen, 2012), we ran a series of hierarchical regressions to examine whether honesty-humility 
explained incremental variance in dictator allocations beyond politeness. In Studies 1, 3, and 4, 
adding honesty-humility led to a significant increase in explained variance in dictator allocations 
after controlling for politeness; however, honesty-humility was not a significant incremental 
predictor after controlling for politeness in Study 2. 
4 At the facet level of HEXACO honesty-humility, previous research has identified the 
fairness and greed avoidance facets as unique predictors of prosocial allocations of wealth 
(Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zettler, 2014). In our research, we observed less consistency, with all four 
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facets of sincerity, greed avoidance, modesty, and fairness differentially correlating with 
allocations depending on the study. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Study Design and Major Results across Studies 
  Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Participant details     
Final N 192 212 304 90 
Sample 
Psychology 
students 
US MTurk 
workers 
US MTurk 
workers 
Students, members 
of the community 
Mean age (SD) 20.21 (4.52) 29.94 (8.47) 30.90 (9.89) 22.38 (3.76) 
% female 75% 59% 55% 70% 
N (%) removed after validation 14 (6.8%) 12 (5.4%) 36 (11%) 13 (13%) 
Dictator game details 
Incentivization Hypothetical Hypothetical Hypothetical Incentivized 
Format Standard Standard Decomposed Standard 
Mean allocation (SD)a 4.03 (1.80) 4.32 (1.72) 4.57 (1.30) 2.59 (2.20) 
% keeping all 13% 9.9% 5.9% 34% 
Personality traits correlated with dictator allocations 
B5 traits B5Ab  B5Ab  B5Ab B5Ab 
Aspects of B5 
agreeableness B5Comp, B5Polc B5Comp, B5Polc B5Comp, B5Polc B5Polc 
HEX traits HEXHb, HEXA HEXHb HEXHb, HEXC HEXHb, HEXOb 
 
Note. B5 = Big Five Model, measured using the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 
2007). B5A = B5 Agreeableness. B5Comp = B5 Compassion. B5Pol = B5 Politeness. HEX = 
HEXACO Model, measured using the HEXACO Personality Inventory—Revised (HEXACO-
PI-R; Lee & Ashton, 2004). HEXA = HEXACO Agreeableness. HEXC = HEXACO 
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Conscientiousness. HEXH = HEXACO Honesty-Humility. HEXO = HEXACO Openness to 
experience. 
aDictator allocations indicate amount allocated to partner out of 10 points (corresponding with 
dollar amounts) or $10. 
bSignificant unique predictor when all broad domains from the same personality model were 
entered in a regression on dictator allocations. 
cSignificant unique predictor when both aspects of B5 agreeableness were entered in a regression 
on dictator allocations. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations between Personality Variables and Dictator 
Allocations 
Variable M (SD) 
Correlations 
1 2 3 4 5 
Study 1 (N = 192)       
1. B5 Agreeableness 3.85 (0.47) .88     
2. B5 Compassion 3.96 (0.55) .87** .89    
3. B5 Politeness 3.74 (0.53) .86** .50** .77   
4. HEX Honesty-Humility 3.23 (0.53) .49** .35** .50** .81  
5. HEX Agreeableness 3.03 (0.54) .48** .33** .50** .31** .84 
6. DG allocationa 4.03 (1.80) .21** .14* .20** .30** .19** 
Study 2 (N = 212)       
1. B5 Agreeableness 3.76 (0.52) .88     
2. B5 Compassion 3.81 (0.58) .88** .86    
3. B5 Politeness 3.70 (0.60) .89** .58** .77   
4. HEX Honesty-Humility 3.44 (0.61) .46** .27** .55** .83  
5. HEX Agreeableness 2.98 (0.54) .41** .31** .41** .31** .82 
6. DG allocationa 4.32 (1.72) .19** .15* .20** .25** .09 
Study 3 (N = 304)       
1. B5 Agreeableness 3.85 (0.45) .86     
2. B5 Compassion 3.88 (0.57) .87** .88    
3. B5 Politeness 3.81 (0.50) .83** .43** .74   
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4. HEX Honesty-Humility 3.47 (0.57) .42** .23** .51** .82  
5. HEX Agreeableness 3.02 (0.55) .28** .17** .32** .21** .84 
6. DG allocationa 4.57 (1.30) .20** .19** .17** .20** .10 
Study 4 (N = 90)       
1. B5 Agreeableness 3.78 (0.44) .84     
2. B5 Compassion 3.88 (0.55) .87** .86    
3. B5 Politeness 3.68 (0.48) .82** .42** .70   
4. HEX Honesty-Humility 3.28 (0.60) .45** .29** .48** .84  
5. HEX Agreeableness 2.96 (0.59) .33** .09 .49** .25* .87 
6. DG allocationa 2.59 (2.20) .23* .13 .26* .32** .12 
 
Note. Cronbach’s αs are shown in the diagonal. For correlations between all personality and 
game variables, see supplemental material available on request from the authors. B5 = Big Five 
Model, measured using the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007). DG = 
Dictator game. HEX = HEXACO Model, measured using the HEXACO Personality Inventory—
Revised (HEXACO-PI-R; Lee & Ashton, 2004). 
aBivariate correlations calculated using Spearman’s rho. Dictator allocations indicate amount 
allocated to partner out of 10 points (corresponding to dollar amounts) or $10. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Table 3 
Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Amount Allocated to Partner in the Dictator 
Game 
 Variable 
Study 1   Study 2   Study 3   Study 4 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
B5 Agreeableness 0.15*   0.25**   0.19**   0.21^  
B5 Extraversion -0.03   -0.05   0.01   -0.05  
B5 Neuroticism -0.05   0.00   -0.05   0.04  
B5 Openness/Intellect -0.01   -0.09   -0.06   0.18  
B5 Conscientiousness 0.11   0.06   0.05   -0.05  
HEX Honesty-Humility  0.26**   0.20**   0.20**   0.31** 
HEX Emotionality  0.10   0.13^   0.09   0.12 
HEX Extraversion  0.02   0.03   0.05   -0.01 
HEX Agreeableness  0.10   0.04   0.04   0.09 
HEX Conscientiousness  0.08   0.05   0.08   0.03 
HEX Openness to 
Experience 
 0.01   -0.06   -0.03   0.22* 
R2 .04 .11  .06 .06  .04 .07  .09 .20 
Adjusted R2 .02 .08   .04 .04   .03 .05   .03 .14 
 
Note. B5 = Big Five Model, measured using the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 
2007). HEX = HEXACO Model, measured using the HEXACO Personality Inventory—Revised 
(HEXACO-PI-R; Lee & Ashton, 2004). 
^p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Table 4 
Regression Analysis of the Aspects of Big Five Agreeableness on Amount Allocated to Partner in 
the Dictator Game 
Variable  R2 Adjusted R2 β t p 
Study 1 (N = 192) .04 .03  
  Intercept    1.62 .11 
  Politeness   0.20 2.36 .02 
  Compassion   -0.01 -0.15 .88 
Study 2 (N = 212) .06 .05  
  Intercept    1.93 .06 
  Politeness   0.25 3.00 .003 
  Compassion   0.01 0.11 .91 
Study 3 (N = 304) .04 .03  
  Intercept    3.94 < .001 
  Politeness   0.13 2.09 .04 
  Compassion   0.09 1.41 .16 
Study 4 (N = 90) .07 .05  
  Intercept    -1.09 .28 
  Politeness   0.22 1.96 .05 
  Compassion   0.06 0.56 .58 
 
 
